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In the years 1933-1945, Hitler’s Nazi Party [National Socialist 
Democratic Workers Party / NSDAP] used music as a tool to forge political unity 
among Germans.  Hitler and the senior NSDAP leadership instinctively grasped 
that among the arts, music was the most readily laden with ideology, and could 
inculcate both the youth and the masses with state-serving Bildung.1  Nazi 
music education, promoted heavily by and among the Hitler Youth, expanded along 
with concerns of “cultural Bolshevism,” and served as a counterpoint to 
“degenerate music.”2  Once in power, Hitler moved to purge music and music 
scholarship of Jews in an effort to promote the unique origin myths of the 
German Volk and further saturate citizens with racial theories.  In keeping 
with origin myths and racialism were the Romantic works of the composer Richard 
Wagner, a prominent anti-Semite who would assume supreme musical status in 
Hitler’s Germany.3  In such a personalized regime as Hitler’s, the dictator’s 
tastes virtually defined official aesthetic norms.4   
Throughout the period of Hitler’s chancellorship, the musical bureaucracy 
of the NSDAP would struggle to balance the tensions between art music 
(symbolized by Wagner) and popular demand for music such as jazz.  These very 
tensions were also reflected in the musical policies of the German occupation 
of Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia, an occupation which simultaneously 
plundered antique musical treasures and brought about demand for popular fare 
behind the lines.  Ultimately the adoring songs of the soldiers – many of them 
graduates of the Hitler Youth -- would transform into a dirge.  German musical 
culture and education would thereafter split between the Allied-occupied West 
and the anti-fascist East.  This paper will examine administrative, educational, 
and artistic aspects of musical policies in the Third Reich.5      
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Nazi Musical Hierarchy 
The appearance of absolute hierarchy in the National Socialist state was 
belied by a befuddling proliferation of informal bureaucracies.  Justified by 
vague and turgidly-worded memos from their Führer, Hitler’s close associates 
carved out their own personal spheres of influence.6  Hitler’s unwillingness to 
clearly lay out lines of command, combined with his intense personal interest 
in artistic policy, resulted in an administrative situation in the arts which 
was exceedingly complicated.  In 1933, competing National Socialist entities 
separately claimed control of all musical theaters in the Reich, proclaimed 
jurisdiction over all state musicians, pronounced guidelines for publication of 
musical materials, and sparred over administration of musical culture 
generally.7  A key figure in these struggles, and a key figure in any study of 
Nazi cultural policy, was Alfred Rosenberg.  For all of his failings – from 
inflating Hitler’s trust to vacillating administration in the occupation of the 
East – Rosenberg undeniably possessed a keen awareness of the power and potency 
of art forms as a means of ideological struggle.8  In response to electoral 
defeats in 1928, Rosenberg had fashioned a political contingent upon the arts 
that would attract the German middle class to the NSDAP.  He also established 
the Nazi Society for German Culture [Nationalsozialistische Gesellshaft für 
deutsche Kultur].   
In keeping with the administrative entropy that characterized Nazi 
operations, Rosenberg’s Society for German Culture spawned still more 
organizations. The League of Struggle for German Culture [Kampfbund für 
deutsche Kultur], founded in 1930, became an important offshoot.  This 
organization consisted of departments for music, cinema, visual arts, and radio, 
and effectively served as the forerunner of Goebbel’s Ministry for 
Enlightenment and Propaganda [Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und 
Propaganda].  In 1933, Rosenberg’s adjutants seized control of German music 
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publications such as Die Musik, which thereafter incessantly warned of the 
deleterious effects of “un-German,” (i.e., Bolshevik and Jewish) musical 
culture.  Membership in the Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur shot upwards.  From a 
membership of one thousand in 1932, the Kampfbund saw more than 20,000 new 
members join up in the first eight months of Hitler’s Chancellorship.9  Music 
thus functioned not only as an emblem of German distinctiveness, but served as 
a magnet for mass involvement in party activities.10 
 Rosenberg was the early architect of Nazi cultural policies, but he was 
not their ultimate champion.  On July 20, 1933, only months after the 
Gleichshaltung, Hitler arrogated far-reaching oversight over state culture to 
Joseph Goebbels.11  A philologist and failed writer, Goebbels welded the whole 
of German artistic culture to the aims of the Nazi state.12  The diminutive 
Goebbels would have lasting impacts on German musical culture.  The ease of 
Goebbels’ first task—the co-opting of arts organizations—had been facilitated 
by the financial devastation of the preceding Weimar Republic.  The Weimer era 
may have produced some of Germany’s greatest cultural figures, but a period of 
fiscal abundance it was not.  Orchestras, the Berlin Philharmonic among them, 
were actively seeking state support and patronage from any party in 1933.13  
Guided by Goebbels, the Nazis supplied the Philharmonic with operating funds 
and in the process armed themselves with a significant tool that conferred the 
Party additional legitimacy among German elites. 
Not only symphony orchestras fell under Nazi sway.  On September 22, 
Goebbels established the Reichsmusikkammer (Reichs Chamber of Music).  Although 
Richard Strauss was the president of the RMK, real power lay in the hands of 
the organization’s chair, Peter Raabe, pliant and anti-Semetic musicologist.14  
By 1934, the organization consisted of seven departments for composers, 
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performing musicians, concert managers and publicists, choral and folk singers, 
music publishers, music dealers, and music instrument manufacturers, 
respectively.15  The high degree of organization indicated also that the RMK 
was not free to set its own course in the arts.  In keeping with his desire to 
see the Propaganda Ministry become the cultural arbiter for all of societ
Goebbels would provide the RMK with direction from above.  As scholars would 




16   
Although orchestras suffered purges of their Jewish personnel, orchestral 
programming was not immediately brought into harmony with the anti-Semetic 
party line.  Felix Mendelssohn, Berlin’s wunderkind of the early 19th century, 
initially escaped censure, and his celebrated Violin Concerto remained on the 
programs of the Berlin Philharmonic.  Stravinsky, another problematic Jewish 
genius, enjoyed a 1935 performance of “Firebird” in Berlin.17   In the autumn 
of that year, however, the NSDAP cultural apparatus initiated more codifie
efforts to end the performance of music even marginally associated with Jews.  
On September 1, 1935, Gobbels’ Propaganda Ministry issued a document for 
internal circulation, outlining a “blacklist” of 108 composers whose  works 
could no longer be played in the lands ruled by the Reich.  Of the composers 
listed, most were Jewish.  Goebbels clearly attributed high importance to both 
classical music and the elimination of the “Judenfrage” within the community of 
musicians.18  As if the ouster of scores of composers had not made his case 
explicit enough, Goebbels orchestrated a public ceremony outside the venerable 
Leipzig Gewandhaus in order to tear down Mendelssohn’s bust.  Little would be 
left to chance in the sphere of high culture.   
 
Music and Youth 
With the inception of Nazi rule in Thuringina and across Germany, the 
NSDAP conspicuously sought legitimacy through the promotion of German music. 
The National Socialists thus merged their ideology with a deeply ingrained 
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German song culture in a successful bid to assume a leading role in the music 
education of the youth. Such a perspective is particularly necessary when one 
considers Germany occupied an elite position at the end of Weimar period as a 
world leader in the realm of music education.  In the free-wheeling mélange 
that preceded Hitler’s accession to the Chancellorship, a number of German 
music educators and pedagogues had experimented with bold pedagogical 
approaches that have since become the pillars of Western musical education.19  
The emerging pedagogical canons promoted Carl Orff and J.E. Dalcroze, however, 
were eventually overwhelmed by the ideologically-driven National Socialist 
party machinery.  Working from the basis of German tradition, German music 
educators were inevitably co-opted by the state.    
Like the music historians whose work is examined by Pamela Potter, German 
music educators also had to pay obeisance to the skewed racial theories of the 
National Socialist leadership.  While music historians were scrounging 
selectively for examples of “Musik im Judentum,” the task of music educators 
became similarly wrapped up with the National Socialist cause.  One National 
Socialist music educator, Fritz Jöde, wrote of the important role played by 
music in Kindergarten, a level he clearly believed should mark the beginning of 
overt state control over children.  Euphemistically, Jöde wrote of Kindergarten 
as “a conclusive break from children’s reliance on their mothers” and the 
beginning of “going their own way…to fulfill their goals and dreams as 
adults.”20  Kindergarten marked a clear opportunity for the state to sedulously 
promote Nazism through ideological texts.     
Wolfgang Stumme, an educator and editor, became one of the most prolific 
advocates of National Socialist music education.  His 1944 essay “Music in the 
Hitler Youth” reveals much about the climate for arts education under the 
Nazis.21  Stumme enthusiastically cited over nine hundred musical groups united 
under the banner of the Hitler Youth, including all manner of youth choirs.  To 
this list, Stumme noted the presence of “orchestras, instrumental groups, 
groups of wind-playing comrades, music teams, sport and fanfare teams, song-
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20 Fritz Jöde, “Haus und Familie: Die Musik im Kindesalter,” from Musik im Volk: 
Gegenswartsfragen der Deutschen Musik, Wolfgang Stumme, ed., (Berlin: Berlin-
Lichterfeld Verlag, 1944) p. 79-84. 
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playing and puppet shows, and radio groups,” all sponsored by the Hitler Youth.  
Stumme, in a veiled plea for resources in the waning years of the Second World 
War, linked the expansion of music groups to the war effort:  
 
This high number [of musical groups] has arisen from the progress 
of the war, the beginning of which saw only one hundred unified 
[Hitler Youth] music groups.  These groups evidence the 
foundational emotions of gratefulness that Germans hold toward all 
cultural efforts of the Hitler Youth; they also prove that 
political leadership and music education are intimately unified.  
The war has established itself as the father of music practice, 
and formed an explicit antithesis of the old Latin saying that 
during the war the muses must have silence.  The rich number of 
Hitler’s words [zahlreich Führerworte] on the “importance” of art 
are like the deepest kernels which the youth, in their action, 
transform into a constant state of fulfillment.22   
 
Throughout the war effort, Hitler Youth raised flagging morale by singing at 
community events, hospitals, and factories.  In the words of one Hitler Youth 
executive, performances of the “Hitler Youth Cultural Circle” simultaneously 
supported the war effort and “expose[d] the boys and girls to our nation’s most 
valuable cultural heritage.”23  German musical traditions thus fused with 
party-centered patriotism.   
                                                
The music of the Hitler Youth played an important role in state 
indoctrination and public morale, and the visual arts thus validated and 
eulogized the idea of musical youth.  A mural by Jürgen Wegener shows the ideal 
musical setting for the boys of the Hitler Youth.  The centerpiece of his 
triptych shows six boys in a circle, grasping bugle and drum, joining in the 
anthem entitled “For us the sun never sets.”24  Such images were infused with 
the National Socialist desire to unite the nation through the martial music of 
the youth.  It was not merely by coincidence, after all, that Leni Riefenstahl 
chose to highlight group musical activities of German youth in her film 
apotheosis of the Nazi Party, Triumph of the Will.   
 
22 Wolfgang Stumme, “Musik im Hitlerjungend,” p.21.  
23 Hitler Youth War Service Plan, 3 February 1940.  Quoted in Jeremy Noakes, 
Nazism 1919-1945: A Documentary Reader, Vol. 4, The German Home Front in World 
War II (Exeter, United Kingdom: University of Exeter Press, 1998), pp. 399-400. 
24 From the textbook Neubau des Deutschunterrichts, ed. Wilhelm Rathrath, Vol. 
IV: Das fünfte und sechste Schuljahr: “Vond der Heimat zur Nation“ (Münster: 
Heinrich Buschmann Verlag, 1936), pp. 238-239.  Quoted in George L. Mosse, Nazi 
Culture: Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich (New York: 
Grosset & Dunlap, 1968), pp. 290-291. 
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Beyond mere imagery, National Socialist musical curricula dipped deep 
into the stream of German folk tunes, creating a base of easily-retained tunes 
onto which nationalist texts could be sedulously placed.25  The Nazis thus used 
the classic totalitarian model of music education first promoted by Plato, 
while simultaneously drawing upon theories of Martin Luther in order to improve 
the efficacy of their musical indoctrination.26  In an age proliferating with 
radios and jazz, however, these techniques would be severely tested.  The Nazis 
were not alone in their efforts to secure the loyalty of the youth.  Music was 
a battleground through which the NSDAP endeavored to wrest control of 
children’s hearts and minds from Germany’s established churches.    
While maneuvering to separate the youth from the churches, the National 
Socialist Party also moved to counter secular rivals in the sphere of music 
education.  As became apparent in Vienna, the NSDAP expanded its influence 
among the youth by establishing Hitler Jungend music schools.27  The Anschluss 
of 1938 had not resulted in the immediate Nazi control over the musical 
apparatus; indeed, Vienna’s relative cultural autonomy in the early months of 
the Anschluss was reflected in the independence of all twenty-seven of the 
city’s youth music schools.  As part of political consolidation in 1938, the 
National Socialists opened two branch schools [Zweigschule für Volk und 
Jungend].  The first of these schools was planned for and administered by the 
Hitler Youth.28  By 1942, the Hitler Youth music school had attracted 
sufficient numbers of students to close down six of Vienna’s non-Nazi youth 
music schools.  Administrator Othmar Steinbauer, the head of the Hitler 
schools, celebrated this triumph in a statement flecked with Austrian dialect
“Now only the Party is the force for progress.  In strenuous cooperation with 
the community of Vienna, we set out to create a school fully new in form, 
through which the Volk, the youth, the industrious classes, and the artistic 
Youth 
:  
                                                 
25 Fritz Jöde, “Haus und Familie: Die Musik im Kindesalter,” from Musik im Volk, 
p. 85.  
26 Frederic Spotts, Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics (Woodstock and New York: 
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elite will unite and train for music.”29  The unity that had eluded Germans 




Third Reich:   
                                                
Epitomizing this common musical culture was folk music, a genre which 
took on renewed importance in the Nazi period.  Although Germans had been 
drawing inspiration from their linguistic and mythical origins since the early 
nineteenth century, the Nazis enacted a particularly forceful and self-
conscious turn to this product of the Volk.  A 1934 essay by Fritz Stein, a 
music professor in Bremen, directly illustrates the connection between Nazi 
ideology and folk music.  Stein’s essay “On the Nature of German Music” posited 
that folk music was the key method of unifying a fragmentary people.30  
Moreover, as long as it remained undiluted and true to its German roots, folk 
music was an essential means of gaining respect abroad.  The purity of German 
music, the sacred symbol of the Volk, was also a means of national cultural 
defense in a hostile world.  Stein described the responsibilities of the 
musician in the 
The task of the German guardians of music is to be the 
intermediaries between art and the Volk.  Our experience with 
German musical culture allows us to understand uniquely; we are 
the defenders of our highest musical inheritance, of its fullness 
and fulfilling purity.  To further this defense, we must win over 
the Volk through orderly plans of education [Erziehung].  Our 
foundational work strives for unity, and we must strive to 
complete the desired and worthy goal: to create the great musical 
unity of Germans and to further struggle for the world recognition 
of German music.31   
 
With “world recognition of German music” came the possibility of German music 
serving as the glue for a new German empire.  Indeed, military campaigns into 
such regions as Poland and Ukraine prompted German musicologists to press hard 
for folk music education as a means of cementing the consolidation of the newly 
acquired Eastern territories.32  As the Germans knew from their own experience, 
political consolidation could be considered complete only when broad masses of 
 
29 “Musikhochschule der Gaustadt Wein,” Volkische Beobachter, Ausgabe Wien, Nr. 
148, 12. August 138.  Quoted in Fred K. Prieberg, Musik im NS-Staat (Frankfurt 
am Main: Fischer Tashenbuch Verlag, 1982), p. 251.     
30 Professor Fritz Stein, “Vom Wesen deutscher Musik,” Bremer Nachtrichten, 5. 
Sept 1934.  Quoted in Prieberg, Musik im NS-Staat, p. 260.   
31 Ibid. 
32 Pamela Potter, The Most German of the Arts, p. 153. 
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citizens could raise their voices to the same tunes and words without fear of 
reproach.    
National Socialist efforts to guarantee the loyalty of German youth, 
however, inevitably clashed with ecclesiastical tradition.  Up until the 
forceful emergence of youth movements in the early twentieth century, German 
churches had held a monopoly on ritualistic rites of passage.  A regional 
report from a National Socialist Party Chancellery in April 1943 outlined 
several difficulties confronting the party in its competition with the churches.  
The report stated that although induction ceremonies for new Hitlerjungend had 
followed all guidelines issued by the Propaganda Ministry, progress in 
recruiting new members remained slow.  The report complained:  
 
These [Hitlerjungend] ceremonies are still not accorded the importance 
which they deserve, particularly in those districts where the churches 
are strong.  The fact that a large number of those being inducted had 
already participated in a corresponding church ceremony was 
particularly invidious.33   
 
The report went on to highlight the importance of the “musical background of 
the ceremonies,” criticizing wartime conditions for the lack of “appropriate 
musical backing.”34  Although Germans were feverishly importing pianos 
appropriated from Jewish homes in France and the East, Allied bombs were 
steadily consuming musical instruments of all vintages, particularly pipe 
organs.35  As posited by the educator Stumme, the organ was absolutely 
necessary for instilling the baptismal “spirit of Nazi cele
[“nationalsocialistische Feiergestaltung”].
bration” 
                                                
36  Lacking an appropriate musical 
backdrop, local Hitler Youth leaders could rely only on group song to create 
the mystical ambience for the rituals. Ultimately, the combined strength of 
 
33 Quoted in Jeremy Noakes, Nazism 1919-1945: A Documentary Reader, pp. 405-406.   
34 Ibid.   
35 Rosenberg was bringing pianos into the country for not only the Hitler Youth, 
but the Wehrmacht and the SS.  See Willem de Vries, Sonderstab Musik: Music 
Confiscation by the Ensatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg under the Nazi Occupation 
of Western Europe (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996).  For further 
documentation of Nazi looting, see United States National Archives and Records 
Administration, Office of Strategic Services, OSS Art Looting Investigation 
Reports, 1945-1946,  Microfilm Publication # 1782 (Washington, D.C., 2001).  
36 Stumme, “Musik im Hitlerjungend,” from Musik im Volk, p. 30.   
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Nazi art and music was unable to uproot sacred institutions whose techniques of 
musical and aesthetic indoctrination had matured over millennia.37  
Wagner and National Socialist Culture 
In their drive towards legitimacy, the Nazi Party took pre-existing 
elements of German nationalism and amplified them tremendously.  In the Nazi 
period, therefore, the philosophical underpinnings of musical culture 
increasingly rested upon Wagnerian ideals.  The composer’s well-known writings 
and compositions accorded with Hitler’s ideology, and the cult of Wagner grew 
prodigiously under the Nazis.38  Wagner Societies, already a fixture of 
bourgeois [Bürgerlich] German life, further proliferated across the country.  
Individuals joined for divergent reasons: some were prompted by Hitler’s 
nationalistic awakening, others by careerist desires, while others desired only 
the appearance of ideological conformity.  Reflecting the prevalence of Wagner 
as a symbol for German culture, Wehrmacht troops brought scores of the opera 
Parsifal to Paris, placing their Teutonic totems prominently in the looted 
homes of elite French musicians.39  Even simple German soldiers took great 
pains to affront French musical culture and thereby validate German national 
pride
sical 
 holding up Wagner as the 
attainable paragon of German musical expression: 
 
n.  
                                                
.40   
Among artistic circles, Wagner formed the centerpiece of Germanic mu
rhetoric.  In an essay in the prominent journal Die Musik, critic Walter 
Abendroth decried recent products of modernism while
un
[Avant-garde music] was a foul, anti-Volk bacillus that 
denigrated the cultural body through cynicism and calculatio
 
37 For discussion of Nazi policy toward German churches, see Claudia Koontz, 
Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1988), chapters 7 and 8.  For an interesting perspective on the 
impact of Nazism on postwar churches, see Matthew D. Hockenos, A Church Divided: 
German Protestants Confront the Nazi Past (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2004).     
38 Some recent scholarship takes a radical view of this connection, describing 
Wagner as “the source of his [Hitler’s] identity.”  See Joachim Kohler, 
Wagner’s Hitler: The Prophet and his Disciple, Ronald Taylor, translator 
(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, Inc. [Polity Press], 2000), p. 264.   
39 Willem de Vries, Sonderstab Musik. 
40 Such incidents, however, did not prevent German bureaucrats from allowing 
performances of French music altogether.  For an illuminating discussion of 
opera in Vichy France, see Jane Fulcher, “French Identity in Flux: The Triumph 
of Honegger’s Antigone,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 36:4 (2006) 649-
674.  
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Thus, we seek a renewed clarity to eliminate this bacillus 
which has caused much grief.  So we come – in the sight of 
society, misled classes, and uprooted intellectuals – and 
return to the agreed music-historical situation: composer
(not only Germans but naturally especially Germans) are 




eight of the name and the 
spirit of Richard Wagner.     






nationalistic anti-Semiticism found validation in the Wagnerian oeuvre.   
 
Nazi Germany because Wagner’s work celebrated the genesis of the German nation 
                                                
 
Wagner, in other words, served 
ences could be drawn.    
Hitler’s personal connection to the cult of Bayreuth made Wagner’s image 
all the more powerful during the Gleichschaltung, when moderate statements and
apolitical behavior were cause for suspicion.42  Hitler’s intense interest in 
Wagner’s ideals stemmed from the Austrian’s adolescent self-perceptions as a 
transient artist in Linz and Vienna, cities where he attended many operas as
virtual bottom-feeder in high cultural circles.  Some have speculated that 
Hitler’s failings as a young man enflamed his deep desire to use the arts, 
particularly opera and the visual arts, as a means of propelling him to a 
position from which he could “save Germany.”43  A performance of Wagner’s 
Rienzi in 1906 had called forth visions of grandiosity in the young vagrant.44
Wagner’s musical architecture, his ideals of Gesamtkunstwerk, and his hero
heralds had influenced Hitler profoundly.45  Moreover, Hitler’s traits of 
Hitler’s intimate connections to Wagnerian art forms profoundly 
influenced the artistic direction of state policy in the Third Reich.  This
influence extended beyond Hitler’s idle table talk about the supremacy of 
German tenors.46  Wagner’s opera was accorded with the highest respect by the 
 
41 Walter Abendroth, “Kunstmusik und Volstümlichkeit” in Die Musik, März 1934, s. 
413-414.  Quoted in Joseph Wulf, Musik im Dritten Reich: Eine Dokumentation  
(Gütersloh: Siebert Mohn Verlag, 1963), p. 359.   
42 Pamela Potter, The Most German of the Arts, p. 147. 
43 Hitler’s sketch books bear this out.  See Frederic Spotts, Hitler and the 
Power of Aesthetics. 
44 August Kubizek, The Young Hitler I Knew (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955), p. 
97. 
45 A recent sourcebook on Nazi Germany accords Wagner a great deal of influence, 
including an excerpt from the 1850 essay “Judaism in Music.”  See Roderick 
Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle, eds., The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An 
Anthology of Texts (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 1.  
46 Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens, translators, Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941-1944: 
His Private Conversations (New York: Enigma Books, 2000).   
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and exuded an ebullient volkstum.  Wagner’s Die Meistersinger was the primary 
expression of state-sponsored national identity.47   
Celebrations of Wagner’s genius (and, by extension, the creative potency 
of the German people) were undertaken at tremendous state expense.  In December 
1938, for example, Hitler’s adjutant personally authorized a payment of 150,000 
DM for Clemens Kraus to direct Tannhäuser and Arabella in the Munich State 
Theater.48  Naturally, the NSDAP leadership could justify such expenses with 
arguments about culture superiority and the need to instill the German Volk 
with the myths of their origins.  Hitler’s birthday celebrations were typically 
Wagnerian affairs, although Verdi’s operas were sometimes performed in a 
concession to the alliance with fascist Italy.49   Hitler’s devotion to the 
annual festival in Bayreuth was such that in the dark days of late 1944, Hitler 
insisted that the Wagner festival scheduled for July 1945 proceed as usual.50    
Hitler ultimately saw the fundamental political gain to be reaped by 
declaring himself as the paladin of a reinvigorated and authentically German 
culture. From his position at the pinnacle of the National Socialist hierarchy, 
Hitler skillfully played the cultural card to buttress his legitimacy.  Richard 
Wagner’s music would serve a vital function in this endeavor.   
 
Degenerate Music 
Clearly, Nazi officials wished to use music didactically, using opera and 
symphonic music to heighten the sense of Teutonic identity among the listeners.  
Yet Nazi musical policy was not immune to popular pressures and public demand.  
Goebbels and his subordinates could never escape the necessity of providing 
light entertainment for the masses.  This contradiction between high and 
middlebrow culture became markedly apparent in the wake of military defeats of 
1942, which heralded shortages of food and consumer goods, as well as the 
                                                 
47 Thomas S. Grey, “Wagner’s Die Meistersinger as National Opera (1868-1945),” 
from Music and German National Identity, Celia Applegate and Pamela Potter, eds.  
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp.  78-104. 
48 This document is held in the Bundesarchiv Koblenz and is reproduced in Fred 
Prieberg, Musik im NS-Staat (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Tashenbuch Verlag, 
1982), p. 309.  The free flow of largesse for opera performances was one arm of 
a Nazi musical policy within which leaders used enormous amounts of 
discretionary funds.  When a Japanese violinist toured Germany in 1942, 
Goebbels personally presented her with a priceless Stradavarius.  See Prieberg, 
ibid.   
49 Prieberg, Musik im NS-Staat, p. 309.   
50 Kohler, Wagner’s Hitler, p. 268.   
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initiation of Allied bombing.  While Goebbels wanted to strengthen the backbone 
of the populace with extravagant paeans to sacrifice, such as the film 
“Koblenz,” German citizens increasingly demanded distraction from the 
heightening destruction around them.  Like filmmaking, opera was expensive, but 
Nazis were willing to pay the price.  Ultimately, however, distracting citizens 
with popular broadcast music became more important than engaging them in a 
polemical musical discussion of Germany’s racial origins.   
American music, particularly jazz, had flooded into Germany in the 1920s.  
Nationalist responses to this music focused on the negative African origins of 
jazz while combining fears of American occupation of the Rhineland.  “Entarte 
musik,” or “degenerate music,” became a frequent target for the Nazis.  The 
Nazis endeavored to steer Germans, particularly the young, away from such 
degenerative effects.  In a directive to his propaganda ministry, Goebbels 
stated: “Publications should be produced in a popular style aimed at the masses 
and, in particular, at young people, and should demonstrate that the uncritical 
adoption of certain American activities, such as jazz music...shows a lack of 
culture.” 51 Extending on this theme, Goebbels instructed his subordinate to 
refer explicitly to “the grotesque distortions which occur, for example, in the 
transposition of Bach’s music into jazz.”52  Germanic music, like the Volk 
itself, had to remain pure. 
 Also dangerous to national morals was the music of the new avant-garde, 
which had reached a heyday during the free-wheeling Weimar period.53  
Individuals like Paul Hindemith, scarred by the experiences of World War One, 
had freely released their angst, and in so doing, had vented their distaste for 
the political and artistic order.  Under the new life of the National 
Socialists, potentially dissenting voices were more or less silenced.  In a 
1934 essay from the newly co-opted NS musical organ, Die Musik, a musicologist 
discussed the orthodox view of the avant-garde:  
 
Everywhere in Europe, we Germans have released the immediate 
products of cultural decay, which fall under the name “New Music.”  
This “music” devours our Volk’s living and characteristic art music, 
directly attacking our healthy origins that presently and by all 
means long to recover the smallest Lebensraum.  This “New Music,” in 
                                                 
51 Goebbels’ instructions at daily conference, 16 December 1941.  Quoted in 
Jeremy Noakes, Nazism 1919-1945: A Documentary Reader, p 485.   
52 Ibid.  
53 Peter Gay, Weimar Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).  
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sprit and essence, is antithetical to the people [unvolkstümlich] 
because it releases every natural dissatisfaction.  Worse yet, it 
both knowingly and unconsciously denigrates the possession of the 
healthy feelings and desires felt by the strong, self-knowing Volk, 
whose music is a singular medium of expression, alert and 
humorous.54 
     
Faced with such pabulum in the mid-1930s, cutting-edge composers like Hindemith 
and Krenek had left Germany. 
As for the state at war, clearly the Nazis could not stem the tide toward 
escapism in German musical life.  Strauss’ Arabella, a vapid three-act comedy 
set in nineteenth-century Vienna, was the most well known opera of the Nazi 
period.  The opera’s libretto is utterly devoid of political content, and there 
is nothing particularly Germanic about the story, other than the Viennese 
setting.  But given the circumstances, the work functioned as a display of 
normalcy in a faltering domestic economy.   
Far from the tinsel of opera houses in cities such as Berlin, German 
troops were listening to catchy popular tunes on BBC radio.  The Wehrmacht 
brass complained of this fact to Goebbels, who thereafter conceded that German 
radio should retool summer programming in favor of relaxing comedy and light 
entertainment.  In a rare bit of self-deprecation, Goebbels characterized the 
possible opposition to this idea: “We know that there are a number of grumblers 
who can’t bear that idea and believe that one would survive the war better in 
sackcloth and ashes than with entertainment, cheerfulness and inner calm.”  
Goebbels further remarked that “these things have been carefully thought out 
and considered from all sides,” pre-empting complaints from cultural elites who 
might perceive an unwelcome shift in the policy.55  Even in the prior period, 
Goebbels had shown some flexibility toward popular music, remarking: 
 
Not all music suits everyone.  Therefore that style of entertaining 
music that is found among the broad masses also has a right to exist, 
especially in an epoch in which the task of the state leadership must 
be, next to the difficult concerns that the times bring with them, to 
                                                 
54 Walter Abendroth, „Kunstmusik und Volstümlichkeit“ in Die Musik, März 1934, s. 
413-414.  Quoted in Wulf, Musik im Dritten Reich, p. 359.   
55 Goebbels’ statement read at Ministerial Conference, 21 May 1941. Quoted in 
Jeremy Noakes, p 502.  
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intervene on behalf of the Volk’s recuperation, support, and 
refreshment.56  
 
Acknowledging “difficult times,” Goebbels could justify sponsorship of music 
that might otherwise have verged on the “degenerate.” 
 
Conclusion 
German-speaking lands have always enjoyed a special connection with music.  
Germanic composers were a dominant creative force in classical music from the 
eighteenth century.  Given this weighty musical inheritance and the preeminent 
position of classical music in German life, the atrocities of the Second World 
War stand in stark contradiction to the subtle humanism with which German 
classical music is imbricated.  Indeed, classical music always lies at the crux 
of a question often posed of the period: “How could the Germans who held Bach, 
Beethoven, and Schubert so dear inflict such human cruelty as the final 
solution?”  Unfortunately, Hitler’s state turned this question on its head.  
The Nazis wielded the legacy of Bach, Beethoven, and Schubert precisely to 
justify the defense and expansion of German culture against “cultural 
Bolshevism.”  Faced with the question of musical culture in the midst of war, 
the Nazis may well have replied: “It is precisely because we love Bach, 
Beethoven, and Schubert that we inflict such cruelty.” 
  
                                                 
56„Musikfest woche für das ganze Volk.  Dr. Goebbels sprach auf den Düsseldorfer 
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